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RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND NORTH KOREA
Young Sok KIM'

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, there has been a great deal of discussions
promoting "humanitarian intervention" and its corollary "responsibility to
protect." The purpose of this article is to examine the so-called doctrine of
"humanitarian intervention" and "responsibility to protect" in accordance with
the changing character of state sovereignty and the requirements of international
law.
Recently, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has been
increasingly used by the United States and the NATO member states including
the United Kingdom in justification of their intervention into countries such as
the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. "For example, once it
became clear that the [George W. Bush] administration could not produce any
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the administration fell back upon the
retroactive application of the doctrine of "humanitarian intervention" in order to
somehow justify its war of aggression against Iraq on an ex post facto basis."1
Then, what is the definition of humanitarian intervention? Even though
the term is filled with ambiguity and subject to endless debate,
a working definition of "humanitarian intervention" is best
limited to the threat or use of force by a state, group of states,
or international organization primarily for the purpose of
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protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread
deprivations of internationally recognized human rights,
whether or not the intervention is authorized by the target
2
state or the international community.
Therefore, the rescue by states of their own nationals or transboundary
action by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are not included within this scope. The
focus here is on state action, not NGO's, and on the protection of the target
state's nationals, not their own nationals.
Further, the humanitarian intervention may be subdivided as "UNand "unilateral humanitarian
authorized humanitarian intervention"
intervention." The former is defined as a state or states acting under the express
authority of the United Nations (UN or United Nations) Security Council
pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter while the latter is when humanitarian
intervention is undertaken by a state or states acting without the authority of
either the United Nations or a regional organization.
In this article, I briefly examine the changing character of the norms of
sovereignty and the notion of responsibility to protect, and show that "unilateral
humanitarian intervention" is still in violation of international law while "UNauthorized humanitarian intervention" may be permitted and used under the
strict scrutiny of international law requirements.
II. THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF SOVEREIGNTY
The principle of state sovereignty was the traditional legal order of
3
international relations. Sovereignty is the central notion of international law.
4
Sovereignty is described as "independence from any outside authority". The
purpose of international law was formerly described as creating legal safeguards
for the preservation of the sovereign power vested in a territorial nation state. 5
In the past centuries, sovereignty considered the nation state as the
only legitimate international actor entitled to the protection of international

2 SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING
WORLD ORDER 3-4, vol. 21 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996).
3 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289-290 (Oxford University Press

5'h ed. 1998).
4 STANLEY HOFFMANN, THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

12

(University of Notre Dame Press 1996).
5 David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV.
253, 259-260 (1992).
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law.6 The reigning international legal positivist doctrine said that "only states
could properly be considered the subjects of public international law endowed
and therefore individuals were merely
with international legal personality,
7
objects of international law.",
However, this exclusive premise of sovereignty no longer prevails.
Nations are not the only actors in international affairs. There are many regional
and international organizations exercising jurisdiction across national borders
such as the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS). Further, the
international human rights treaties for protecting individual human rights can
challenge the sovereign power of a nation state by permitting individuals to
claim their own human rights independently before international forums such as
the Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).8 Moreover, the International Criminal Court (ICC),
which was established in 1998 and has 100 state parties, pursues "individual
law, not the state
criminal responsibility" of the violators of international
9
responsibility of the violators' state of nationality.
Therefore, the notion of sovereignty is changing and, "within the
system of international relation[s,] the principle of sovereign consent has proven
to be increasingly unworkable." 10 "Today the nations of the world are [trying]
to cope with the progressive evolution of a system of international relations that
needs to move away from the notion of sovereign consent. . .and toward its
replacement by the principle of consensus founded on reciprocal expectations of
state behavior. ' 1
Professor Oscar Schachter also wrote that "[t]he fact that increasingly
treaties in the economic and social fields as well as in the area of the law of war
recognize the well-being of individuals as their raison d'&re is further evidence
'2
that international law is moving away from its State-centered orientation."'

6

id.

7 FRANCIS

A.

BOYLE,

FOUNDATIONS

OF

WORLD

ORDER:

THE

LEGALIST

APPROACH

TO

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1898-1922) 61 (Duke University Press 1999).

8 THOMAS
Group,

3

BUERGENTHAL ET AL. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 59 (West

d ed., 2002).

9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25, July 17, 1998, 37 ILM 999; Young Sok,
Kim, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary of the Rome Statute, 337-344 (2000)
(unpublished JSD dissertation University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, UMI Dissertation
Services) (on file with author).
10Boyle, supra note 7, at 15.
11Id.
12 OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 81 (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 1991).
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I1. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERVENTION IN
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS
The corollaries of the principle of state sovereignty "are the norm of
the equality of rights of states and the norm of nonintervention in a state's
domestic affairs."' 3 Then, what is the implication of this changing character of
sovereignty to the principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs? The
principle is provided in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter as follows:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice4 the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Even though the words "domestic jurisdiction" seems definite, it has
been interpreted as having evolving meanings. "In the past, the United Nations
found that "domestic jurisdiction" was [not an obstacle] to de-colonization or
anti-apartheid measures. ' 15 Further, if a state has a treaty obligation or an
obligation under customary international law, the state is bound to the
obligation. For example, Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides "A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty."'16 Thus, as more nations commit
to international treaties and customary international
law expands its reach, the
7
concept of "domestic jurisdiction" shrinks.'
In his annual report in 1991, UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de
Cuellar stressed the importance of striking a balance between the rights of states
and the rights of the individual by writing as follows:
I believe that the protection of human rights has now become
one of the keystones in the arch of peace. I am also convinced
that it now involves more a concerted exertion of international
influence and pressure through timely appeal, admonition,
remonstrance or condemnation and, in the last resort, an

13 HOFFMANN, supranote 4, at 12.
14 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
15 SCHEFFER, supra note 5, at 261.
16

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

17 SCHEFFER, supra note 5, at 262.
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appropriate United Nations presence, than what was
regarded
8
as permissible under traditional international law.'
However, Perez de Cuellar did not argue for "humanitarian
intervention", but for "a higher degree of cooperation and a combination of
common sense and compassion."' 9 He wrote that
We need not impale ourselves on the horns of a dilemma
between respect for sovereignty and the protection of human
rights.... What is involved is not right of intervention but the
collective obligation of States to bring relief and redress in
human rights emergencies.2 °
IV. SCHOLARS' OPINIONS ON UNILATERAL
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

1.The Opinion of Antoine Rougier
"The first comprehensive study of humanitarian intervention was
published by Antoine Rougier in 1910.,,2 1 He concluded that humanitarian
intervention looks like "an ingenious juridical technique to encroach little by
little upon the independence of a State" as the following:
The conclusion which emerges from this study is that it is
neither possible to separate the humanitarian from the
political grounds for intervention nor to assure the complete
disinterestedness for the intervening States... Whenever one
power intervenes in the name of humanity in the domain of
another power, it cannot but impose its concept of justice and
public policy on the other State, by force if necessary. Its
intervention tends definitely to draw the [other] State into its
moral and social sphere of influence. It will control the other
State while preparing to dominate it. Humanitarian
intervention consequently looks like an ingenious juridical
18

Id.

19Id. at 263.
20 Id. at 263.
21 BOYLE,

supra note 1, at 107 citing A. Rougier, La th~orie de l'intervention d' humanitY, 17

Revue g~n~ral de droit international public 468.
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technique to encroach little by little upon the independence of
a State in order 22
to reduce it progressively to the status of
semi-sovereignty.
2. The Opinion of Francis A. Boyle
Francis A. Boyle, Professor of International law at the University of
Illinois, "examined the entire history of United States military intervention into
the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific Basin from shortly before the SpanishAmerican War of 1898 up to the.. .Good Neighbor Policy of President Franklin
Roosevelt's administration starting in 1932. "23 Even though "almost all of these
military interventions were publicly justified on some type of humanitarian
grounds by the United States government[, he wrote, according to] actual
historical records[,].. .that this specious rationale was nothing more than mere
propaganda disseminated for the purpose of building public support for military
intervention., 24 Professor Boyle concluded that "under international law,
'humanitarian intervention' is a joke and a fraud that has been repeatedly
manipulated and abused by a small number of very powerful countries in the
North in order to justify wanton military aggression
against and prolonged
25
military occupation of weak countries of the South.,
3. The Opinion of Ian Brownlie
Professor Ian Brownlie of Oxford said that operation of the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention was "open to abuse since only powerful states could
undertake police measures of this sort. 26 He concluded that "no genuine case of
humanitarian intervention has occurred, with the possible exception of the
occupation of Syria in 1860 and 1861. With the embarrassing exception
provided 27by Nazi Germany, the institution has disappeared from modem state
practice

22 BOYLE, supra note 1, at 107.
23 BOYLE, supra note 1, at 107.
24 BOYLE, supra note 1, at 107. See also BOYLE, supra note 7.
25 BOYLE, supra note 1, at 106.
26 IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 338 (7V1ed.

1991).

27 Id. at 340.
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4. The Opinion of Michael Akehurst
In an article, Professor Michael Akehurst reviewed state practice
regarding humanitarian intervention since 1945 including Vietnamese
intervention against Cambodia.28
At the beginning of 1979 Vietnam overthrew the Pol Pot
regime in Cambodia. But, instead of claiming to have
exercised a right of humanitarian intervention, Vietnam
denied that its forces had entered Cambodia and said that Pol
Pot had been overthrown by the Cambodian people.29
In the Security Council debate in January 1979, many states said that
30
"Vietnam had acted illegally by intervening in Cambodia's internal affairs."
Professor Akehurst observed that "Several of these states mentioned the Pol Pot
regime's appalling violations of human rights, but nevertheless said that those
violations did not entitle Vietnam to overthrow that regime. Not a single state
spoke in [favor] of the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention.",31
He concluded as follows:
From this brief survey of state practice, it will be seen that the
concept of humanitarian intervention has been invoked by
states on a surprisingly small number of occasions since 1945,
and on each occasion humanitarian intervention has been
condemned as illegal by other states. Moreover, the United
Nations debates on Cambodia in 1979 provide some evidence
that there is now a consensus among states in [favor] of
treating humanitarian intervention as illegal.32
5. The Opinion of Hedley Bull
Hedley Bull, former Professor of International Relations at Oxford
University, recognized that the "developments in international law in recent
decades, especially in the field of human rights[, might]. . .provide a wide
28 Michael Akehurst, HumanitarianIntervention, in INTERVENTION INWORLD POLITICS 95 (Hedley

Bull ed., 1984).
29 Id. at 97.
30Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 99.
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mandate for legitimate forms of outside involvement in what was previously
considered the sphere of jurisdiction of states. 33 However, he opposed
unilateral humanitarian intervention as follows:
[W]e have a rule of non-intervention because unilateral
intervention threatens the harmony and concord of the society
of sovereign states. If, however, an intervention itself
expresses the collective will of the society of states, it may be
carried out without bringing that harmony and concord into
jeopardy.34
6. The Opinion of Sean D. Murphy
Professor Murphy wrote a book entitled "Humanitarian Intervention"
while he was a lawyer working for the United States Department of State. He
concluded against humanitarian intervention in his book: "In conclusion,
unilateral humanitarian intervention finds little support in the rules of the UN
Charter and in state practice in the post Charter era ... "35 After reviewing
incidents of military intervention after the Cold War such as Liberia, Iraq,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, Professor Murphy
summed up: "Recent events show a striking willingness of states to forego
unilateral humanitarian intervention in favor of Security Council authorization,
thereby reinforcing the views of those that regard unilateral humanitarian
intervention as unlawful. 36
7. Conclusion
Most of the renowned scholars noted above opine that unilateral
humanitarian intervention should not be permitted under current
international
38
37
law. Further, other eminent scholars such as Philip C. Jessup, Louis Henkin,

33 INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS 189 (Hedley Bull, ed., 1984).

SId. at 195.
35 MURPHY, supra note 2, at 387; BOYLE, supra note 1, at 108.
36MURPHY, supra note 2, at 393.
37 PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS-AN INTRODUCTION 172-174 (Archon Books

1956).
38 Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICYI64 (Frederick A. Praeger,

Publishers, 2nd ed. 1979).
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Noam Chomsky, 39 and Oscar Schachter 4° are of the view that unilateral
humanitarian intervention is in violation of international law.
V. LEGITIMATE MILITARY INTERVENTION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. The UN Charter Rules on the Use of Force
The UN Charter contains the "only legitimate justifications and
procedures for the perpetration of violence and coercion by one state against
another state."'41
[T]hese rules include the UN Charter's Article 2(3) and
Article 33(1) obligations for the peaceful settlement of
international disputes; the Article 2(4) prohibition on the
threat or use of force; and the Article 51 restriction of the
right of individual or collective self-defense to repel an actual
"armed attack" or "aggression arm~e," according to the
French-language version of the U.N. Charter. 42
Concerning the right of self-defense, there are "two fundamental
requirements for the "necessity" and "proportionality" of a state's forceful
response to the foreign armed attack or armed aggression." 3
2. International Judicial Cases against Humanitarian Intervention

(i) The Corfu Channel Case
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) unanimously rejected doctrines
of "intervention", "protection" and "self-help" in the Corfu Channel Case
((U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 ICJ 4(Apr. 9)) of 1949 as "being totally incompatible with

39 NoAM CHOMSKY, ROGUE STATES: THE RULE OF FORCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

49-50 (South End

Press 2000).
40 SCHACHTER,

supra note 12, at 125-126.
41BOYLE, supranote I,at 109.
42 Id.
43 id.
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4
the proper conduct of international relations in the post World War H era.'
Rejecting the British arguments in support of these three doctrines in order to
justify its military intervention into Albanian territorial waters, the ICJ ruled:

The Court cannot accept such a line of defence. The Court can
only regard the alleged right of intervention as the
manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past,
given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot,
whatever be the present defects in international organization,
find a place in international law. Intervention is perhaps still
less admissible in the particular form it would take here; for,
from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most
powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the
administration of international justice itself.
The United Kingdom Agent, . . . has further classified
"Operation Retail" among methods of self-protection or selfhelp. The Court cannot accept this defence either. Between
independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an
essential foundation of international relations. The Court
recognizes that the Albanian Government's complete failure
to carry out its duties after the explosions, and the dilatory
nature of its diplomatic notes, are extenuating circumstances
for the action of the United Kingdom Government. But to
ensure respect for international law, of which it is the organ,
the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy
constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty.45
This ICJ decision rejecting doctrines of intervention, protection and
self-help constituted an authoritative declaration of the requirements of
customary international law binding upon all members of the international
community. 46 Moreover,
when all states parties to an international dispute are members
of the United Nations, [UN] Charter articles 2(3), 2(4), and 33
absolutely prohibit any unilateral or multilateral threat or use
of force that is not specially justified by the article 51 right
44id.
4s BOYLE, supranote 1, at 110-11L.; Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 3, 35 (Apr. 9).
46 BOYLE, supra note 1, at 111.
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of....self-defense, or else authorized by the United Nations
Security Council.47
(ii) The Nicaragua Case
In the decision of Nicaragua v. United States of America (1986), the
ICJ condemned the United States Reagan administration's contra/terror war
against Nicaragua.48 In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ "expressly rejected the
assertion by the United States that it had. . .[a] right of military intervention
49
against Nicaragua on the grounds of alleged human rights violations.
"The Corfu Channel case and the Nicaragua case are the two leading
and most conclusive... international law [cases] that soundly condemn in no
50
uncertain terms the so-called doctrine of humanitarian intervention."
3. Conclusion
From the discussions above, one may conclude that the
transnational threat or use of military force and military
intervention by one state against another state is only
permissible in [two cases: (1) the case] of individual or
collective self-defense where the victim state of an armed
attack has expressly requested such assistance from another
state or states[; (2) the case when the conduct is] lawfully
authorized by the U.N. Security Council acting within the
proper scope of the powers delegated to it by the U.N.
member states under the terms of the United Nations
Charter."

47 id.
48 BOYLE, supra note 7, at 165-167.
49 BOYLE, supra note 1, at 113. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 i.C.J.
14, 134 (June 27). Especially, paragraph 268 of the decision provides "In any event, while the
United States might form its own appraisal of the situation as to respect for human rights in
Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect...
The Court concludes that the argument derived from the preservation of human rights in Nicaragua
cannot afford a legal justification for the conduct of the United States." Id.
50 BOYLE, supra note I, at 113.
51 Id.
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VI. HUMAN SECURITY AND RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT

1. The Advent of the Concept of Human Security
In the 1990s, the concept of human security appeared. It means
"freedom from fear - freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, safety,
or lives". The concept of human security is derived from
the transformation of International Human Rights Law in
general and International Humanitarian Law and Criminal
Law in particular. [International law is being transformed]
from a state-oriented [dimension] to a people-oriented
dimension, having regard to both the struggle against
impunity in respect of the perpetrators
and the responsibility
53
to protect in respect of the victims.
This revolution in international
law includes
(1) "the
internationalization of human rights and the humanization of international law[,
(2)] the protection of civilians in armed conflict and the criminalization of
atrocities against civilians; [and (3)] the emergence of the individual as the
subject - and not just the object- of international law. 54
2. Recent Developments concerning the Responsibility To Protect

(i)

Canada's ICISS report

In 2000, inspired by the UN "Secretary General's call to action- and
the demonstrable consequences of inaction in Bosnia and Rwanda,. . . Canada..
.establish[ed] the International Commission on Intervention and the State
Sovereignty (ICISS)". 55 The Commission's report "argues that, where states are

52

Irwin Cotler, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, Building a New International

Law: What Have We Learned, What Must We Do?, Address to the Magna Carta Foundation
(January 12, 2005), available at http://www.news.gc.ca/cfmx/view/en/index.jsp?articleid=120399
(last visited Jan. 20, 2006).
53 Id.
54

id.

55Id.
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unable or unwilling to protect their populations from mass atrocities- or where
the state is itself the perpetrator- the international community has the
responsibility to act.", 56 However, the ICISS Report makes it clear that military
intervention needs authorization of the UN Security Council in stating
There is no better or more appropriate body than the United
Nations Security Council to authorize military intervention
for human protection purposes. The task is not to find
alternatives to the Security Council, but to make the Security
Council work better than it has.57
(ii) UN High Level Panel Report
Further, in December 2004, the United Nations High Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change issued a report, entitled "A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility." Paragraph 203 of the Report endorsed a
collective international responsibility to protect when sovereign governments
have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent as follows:
We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective
international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the
Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last
resort, in the event of genocide and other large scale killing,
ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international
humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved
powerless or unwilling to prevent.58
However, the UN Panel Report also summarized the threshold criteria
and precautionary principles which restrain the responsibility to protect and
forcible humanitarian intervention. These five precautionary principles are:
1) The Principle of the Seriousness of the Threat: Is the threat in
question serious enough to justify the use of military force?

56 Id.

57 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), ICSS Report, The
Responsibility to Protect xii (December 2001).
58 The Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Report of the Secretary General's High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 203, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).[hereinafter UN PanelReport]
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2) The Proper Purpose Principle: Is it clear that the primary purpose of
the proposed military action is to stop or avoid the humanitarian catastrophe in
question?
3) The Principle of Last Resort: Has every non-military option been
explored?
4) The Proportionality Principle: Is the use of force proportionate to
the objectives sought to be secured?
5) The Balance of Consequences Principle: Is the intervention likely to
be successful, and the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the
consequences of inaction? 59
(iii) 2005 World Summit Outcome Report Concerning
Responsibility to Protect
Heads of state and government gathered at United Nations
Headquarters in New York from September 14-16, 2005. The World Summit
Outcome Report has three paragraphs on responsibility to protect. 60
'9 Id. at 207.
60 The text of three paragraphs are as follows:
Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community
should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning
capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United
Nations, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to
take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by
case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the
General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter
and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol5/iss1/3
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The World Summit Outcome Report emphasizes responsibility to
protect through "peaceful means" by saying "the international community,
through the United Nations,. . . has the responsibility to use appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter [of the United Nations], to help to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity." '6' Further, the World Summit Outcome Report is in favor of
"collective action. . .through the security council," not unilateral action by
providing
we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and
decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance
with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by case
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations
as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and
national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity.62
3. An Evaluation
These recent developments of human security and responsibility to
protect are responses to the UN's failure to protect human lives in Srebrenica
and Rwanda. "In July of 1995 approximately 10,000 Bosnian Muslim men and
boys staying at a UN "safe haven" in Srebrenica were killed by the Bosnian
Serb Army acting at the behest of the Milosevic regime and Serbia., 63 The "UN
Security Council, the United States, the NATO states, the European Union..
.allowed this shameful event to happen." 64 In 1994, "the world witnessed

appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to
assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.
140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the SecretaryGeneral on the Prevention of Genocide. 2005 World Summit, Sept. 14-16,
2005, 205 WORLD SUMMIT OUTCOME,

138-140, U.N. AIRES/60/1 (Oct.

24, 2005)[hereinafter World Summit Outcome Report]
61 World Summit Outcome Report, supra note 60 at para. 139.
62 id.
63 BOYLE, supra note I, at 115.
64Id.
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outright genocide inflicted by the Hutu government against the 65
Tutsis in
Rwanda.. .while the U.N. Security Council stood by and did nothing.
It is an important step for the United Nations to respond to its former
failure by making the UN Panel Report and the World Summit Outcome
Report. The UN Panel report has merits in that it applies a broad definition of
the UN Charter's peace and security mandate, declares precautionary principles,
and sets much higher and effective standards than previously set by the UN in
Srebrenica and Rwanda.
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the UN Panel Report does
not recognize unilateral humanitarian intervention as lawful. It clearly states
unilateral humanitarian intervention violates articles 2(3), 2(4) and 51 of the UN
Charter as follows:
185. The Charter of the United Nations, in Article 2.4,
expressly prohibits Member States from using or threatening
force against each other, allowing only two exceptions: selfdefence under Article 51, and military measures authorized by
the Security Council under Chapter VII (and by extension for
regional organizations under Chapter VIII) in response to
"any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression".
186. For the first 44 years of the United Nations, Member
States often violated these rules and used military force
literally hundreds of times, with a paralysed Security Council
passing very few Chapter VII resolutions and Article 51 only
rarely providing credible cover. Since the end of the cold war,
however, the yearning for an international system governed
by the rule of law has grown. There is little evident
international acceptance of the idea of security being best
preserved by a balance of power, or by any single - even
benignly motivated - superpower.66
To conclude, it is fair to argue, first, as of today unilateral
humanitarian intervention without the express authorization of the UN Security
Council is a violation of international law and the possibility of collective
humanitarian intervention authorized by the UN Security Council becomes
greater than before.
65

id.

66The UN Panel Report, supra note 58 paras. 185-186.
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VII. THE CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH KOREA

1.

Introduction

Since the announcement by the United States on October 16, 2002 that
North Korea (North Korea or DPRK) had acknowledged that it had a
"program .... to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, 67 tensions in the Korean
Peninsula have increased.
In confirmation hearings before the U.S. Senate on January 18, 2005,
the nominee for the U.S. Secretary of State and current Secretary of State,
Condoleezza Rice, said that international unity was necessary to apply pressure
on North Korea to abandon its nuclear arms program.68 She also mentioned
North Korea as one of the six "outposts of tyranny that should be dismantled. 69
Therefore, there are two major international concerns regarding North
Korea: its nuclear weapons program and human rights violations.
2.

North Korea's Nuclear Weapon Problem and Six Party Talks

After North Korea's announcement in October 2002, the United States
together with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) on
October 28, 2002 and Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO) on
November 14, 2002 respectively issued statements "that the DPRK's program
was a violation of the Agreed Framework [between the US and DPRK signed
on October 21, 1994,] the Non-Proliferation Treaty,70 the DPRK-IAEA
Safeguards Agreement and the North-South Joint Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.",7 1 "[Because] of those violations the
KEDO Board decided to suspend heavy oil deliveries as of the December

67

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), IAEA FACT SHEET, 05-24291/FS Series 1/01 Rev.

I/E, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/iaea-e.pdf (last visited
January 30, 2006).
68 Brian Lee, U.S. can deter threatsfrom North, Rice says, JOONGANG DAILY, January 20, 2005.
69 Kim Young-hie, Bush 'sfreedompolicy is nojoke, JOONGANG DAILY, February 6, 2005.
70 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S.
161.
71 IAEA, Fact Sheet, supra note 67.
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[2002] shipment. 7 2 In November and December 2002, the IAEA requested that
the DPRK reply and cooperate with the Agency, but on "December [22, 2002]
the DPRK started to cut seals and disable surveillance cameras. 73 In January
2003, the "IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution January [6,] 2003
that called upon North Korea to cooperate fully and urgently with the Agency..
.[affirming] that unless the DPRK takes all required safeguards measures, it
would be in further non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. 74 However,
"North Korea announced its withdrawal from the [Non-Proliferation Treaty]
effective as of January [11,] 2003." 75 In February 2003, the IAEA referred this
issue to the UN Security Council, and the UN Security Council expressed its
"concern" over the situation in North Korea in April 2003.76 Additionally, "UN
Secretary-General Annan. . .has appointed a Special Advisor on the North
Korea issue. ,,77
Still, the tensions from the North Korea's nuclear weapons program
have not been defused. After three rounds of negotiations, six nations, including
South Korea, North Korea, China, the United States, Russia and Japan, met in
Beijing, China and held talks in July 2005. However, after nearly two weeks of
the six party talks, the parties deadlocked over the issue of "peaceful use" of
nuclear programs. 78 But, North Korea and the United States said an agreement
remained possible. 79 Negotiators from the six countries announced the six-party
Joint Statement on September 19, 2005 which "was intended to set the for the
negotiation of a specific process through which North Korea would abandon a
nuclear weapons program in return for economic and political steps by the other
parties (in particular the United States), to promote mutual trust, stability and
peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia." 80

72

Id.

73 Id.
74 id.
75Id.
76

IAEA, Fact Sheet, supranote 67.

77 Id.

Jim Yardley, U.S. and North Korea Blame Each Other for Stalemate in Talks, N.Y TIMES,
August 8, 2005 at A4.
79 Id.
80 Scott Snyder, Redouble Efforts on Six-Party Talks, JOONGANG DAILY, December 21, 2005,
availableat http://joongangdaily.joinscom/200512/21/200512212156019109900090109012.html.
78
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3. Human Rights Situation in North Korea and UN Commission on
Human Rights
On April 15, 2004, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a
resolution entitled "Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea".81 The resolution by the Commission expressed "its deep
concern about continuing reports of systemic, widespread and grave violations
of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" and requested
the "Special Rapporteur to report his/her findings and recommendations to the
General Assembly
at its fifty-ninth session and to the Commission at its sixty82
session.,
first
On April 14, 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights again
expressed
its deep concern about continuing reports of systemic,
widespread and grave violations of human rights in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including: (a)
Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, public executions, extrajudicial and arbitrary
detention, the absence of due process and the rule of law,
imposition of the death penalty for political reasons, the
existence of a large number
of prison camps and the extensive
83
use of forced labour;

81Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights Resolution, Situation ofHuman Rights in the
DemocraticPeople'sRepublic of Korea, 2004/13, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127 (Apr. 15, 2004).
82 Id.
83Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 2005/11, 1 U.N. Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/11 (Apr. 14,
2005).
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4. The Possibility of Humanitarian Intervention Against North
Korea
If the UN Commission on Human Rights continues to raise the
situation of human rights in North Korea, there may be some suggestions for
humanitarian intervention against North Korea. However, any suggestions are
very dangerous to the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and in East
Asia. The United States President George W. Bush has already decided it was
too risky to take military action against North Korea in early 2003.84
If military action is taken against North Korea, it could ignite a new
war on the Korean Peninsula and possibly bring a North Korean nuclear attack
on Japan.85 If a full-scale war resumed on the Peninsula, it was estimated in
1993 that there would be as many as one million casualties including 80,000 to
100,000 Americans.86 Furthermore, "the destruction of propert[ies] and
interruption of business activit[ies] [will] cost more than US $1 trillion. 87
The only way to prevent this tragic disaster is through diplomacy based
on international law.88 International law prohibits unilateral humanitarian
intervention without any exceptions. International law permits UN authorized
humanitarian intervention under very strict conditions. Further, international
law gives a mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes and has precedent to
settle disputes peacefully and to prevent wars.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, principles of international law, UN Charter obligations,
ICJ decisions and the opinions of the most respected scholars presume that
humanitarian intervention is unlawful. Therefore, there is a heavy burden of
proof to meet in undertaking the threat or use of force in the name of
humanitarian intervention. With regard to unilateral humanitarian intervention, I
think it is a flagrant violation of international law and has no justification. With
regard to UN-authorized humanitarian intervention, there are five requirements
to be met as specified in the report of the UN High Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change: (1) the Seriousness of the Threat; (2) Proper Purpose;
" David E. Sanger, North Korea Says It Has Made Fuelfor Atom Bombs, N.Y.

TIMES, July

15,

2003 at Al.

85David E. Sanger, No Time to Lose on North Korea, N.Y. Times, July 18, 2003 at A16.
86 Kelly J. Malone, Preemptive Strikes and the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Legal and Political
Limitationson the Use of Force, 12 PAC. RiM L. & POL'Y J. 807, 831 (2003).
87 id.

88 Sanger, supra note 85; but see David Sloss, Forcible Arms Control: Preemptive Attacks on

NuclearFacilities,4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 39, 55-57 (2003).
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(3) Last Resort; (4) Proportionality and (5) Balances of Consequences. Those
who invoke UN authorized humanitarian intervention and the Security Council
must meet the five requirements cumulatively.
Of course, the principles of international law, UN Charter and ICJ
decisions are not the panacea for all contemporary problems in the world.
Further, the right of "humanitarian intervention" and the "responsibility to
protect" are likely to be more frequently invoked in coming years because Cold
War justifications have lost their efficacy. 89 Nevertheless, we should bear in
mind that, in Canada's ICISS Report, UN High Panel Report and UN World
Summit Outcome Report of 2005, there are no references permitting unilateral
military intervention without right authority such as authorization of the
Security Council, authorization of the UN General Assembly under the "Uniting
for Peace Resolution" or authorization of regional organization under Chapter
VIII of the UN Charter.
In this regard, it may be worthwhile to pay attention to the views of
Noam Chomsky:
A standard argument is that we had to do something: we
could not simply stand by as atrocities continued. The
argument is so absurd that it is rather surprising to hear it
voiced. Suppose you see a crime in the streets, and feel that
you can't just stand by silently, so you pick up an assault rifle
and kill everyone involved: criminal, victim, bystanders. Are
we to understand that to be the rational and moral response? 90
Military intervention in the name of responsibility to protect, which
does not have any right authority, seems to be similar to the above-mentioned
situation. Thus, unilateral humanitarian intervention against North Korea does
not seem to be desirable nor permissible under the current conditions. It will do
more harm than good to the Korean people as well as the people of the world.
As a Korean, I hope this article makes a contribution to prevent war, ensure
peace and human security in the Korean Peninsula and East Asia.

89 CHOMSKY, supra note

39, at 49-50.

90 CHOMSKY, supra note 39, at 48.
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